A season before the Sixers burst onto the scene with the combination of Joel Embiid and Ben Simmons, the Miami Heat authored one of the great subplots of the 2016-17 campaign.
Miami, which had lost franchise icon Dwyane Wade in free agency the previous summer, could barely field a serious billboard of tentpole players to draw fans in. They were an island of misfit toys. The first half of their season reflected as much.
11-30 through 41 games. The 27th-ranked offense in the league, according to Cleaning The Glass (CTG). Far too bad for their decent defense to cover up.
The spiral stopped exactly halfway through the season. A remarkable turnaround ensued. The Heat won 13 consecutive games immediately after hitting their low point on the season. They finished 41-41, missing the final playoff seed in the Eastern Conference by a mere tie-breaker to...Jimmy Butler, Dwyane Wade and the Chicago Bulls.
It was almost a storybook ending to a season that was once without a pulse and slowly but surely revived.
Rome wasn't built in a day. Miami mended a plethora of fixable issues to get that ship floating again.
Their transition defense was never quite bad. Despite the abhorrent start to the season, they ranked 14th in opponent points added through transition play and sixth in points allowed per 100 transition plays, per CTG.
More than passable.
But, from January 14, 2017 through the final day of the regular season, the Heat ranked first in both opponent points added through transition play and points allowed per 100 transition plays.
Their offensive improvement was a massive reason for their season turnaround. Perhaps the biggest reason, in fact.
But, one of the other pillars of the story was the jump in transition defense.
They erased almost two points per 100 possessions that opponents would've added through transition play. More impressive, they chopped off almost 10 points allowed per 100 transition plays.
Those numbers have almost nothing to do with talent or physical gifts. They have everything to do with discipline and fundamentals. They have everything to do with controlling what the Heat could control - making the best of what they had available to them.
Fast forward to now. The Sixers have a better record than that Heat team did through 41 games. They have the Play-In tournament to cling to if they want it, a luxury the NBA did not offer back then.
But, the buck has to stop here.
Through 41 games, the Sixers were 30th in both opponent points added per 100 possessions through transition play (4.5) and points allowed per 100 transition plays (135.4), per CTG.
Those putrid numbers aren't exactly separated from the rest of the pack. In fact, there are teams above .500 that rank closely to them in defensive transition. The difference is that they have far better offenses than the Sixers do, and that's not really something Philadelphia can control in the immediate term.
First and foremost, if the Sixers still believe in themselves, the turnaround has to start with things they can control independent of the availabilities of their stars. It just so happens that one of those things is improving upon what happens when the opposition gets out on the run.
The good news is that they do not get to use Embiid as a life raft. Their transition defense stinks out loud with and without him. So, the solution isn't "oh, well if only Embiid was available". That's good news because it means they can look at themselves in the mirror and start mending fences from within.
The bad news is they have to look themselves in the mirror and start mending fences from within, and it's anyone's best guess whether they care enough to do that or are individually humble enough to wonder "maybe I'm part of the problem".
The truth is it's everyone's problem. No one in the organization is spared from this entirely.
Controlling what you can control means being better at communicating in live action. It means heightening your urgency when you see the opposing offense pushing the pace up the floor. It should not be as easy as it is for the opposition to score just by getting the ball up the floor quickly, off make, miss or turnover.
First and foremost, let's start with stopping the basketball. It is on everyone - coaching staff and players - to identify who the opposition's pace-pushers are in transition.
Someone has to impact the ball coming up the floor. Paul George needs to know that the more he retreats, the more he's conceding penetration without forcing Josh Hart to pick up his dribble. He doesn't even need to stop Hart dead in his tracks. Just impede him enough to slow down the break. It might just be enough to prevent the backdoor pass to Jalen Brunson. That's a good spot to drag Tyrese Maxey into the spotlight. If George picks up the ball, someone has to cover for the first pass. All you have to do is read Hart to understand that that is your job. His head is pointed to the right. The only teammates he can see without breaking his stride are Jericho Sims and Brunson. He's also a right-handed player. So, chances are he's going to pass the ball to his right. Maxey is the only Sixer on that side of the floor. What's the logic say? As soon as Maxey starts trailing in the foot race with Brunson, he's failed.
Three edicts were the first things you learned about transition defense, way back when you were a kid at summer camp. First, a coach told you to "get back on defense". Then, you shouted "I got ball" as the 3-on-2 drill commenced. That usually triggered a teammate to yell, "I got first pass!". Then, you fought for the right to stay on the court.
Did everyone on the local NBA team miss that drill at camp?
On the topic of stopping the basketball, just what on earth is this?
No matter how you slice it, even if someone else takes it upon themselves to account for Jamal Murray coming up the floor, it's not difficult to see how this play ends in a Denver bucket. Maybe George sprints into the picture and picks up Murray, leaving Kelly Oubre Jr. to account for Michael Porter Jr. if that pass is made. Then, you'd have Nikola Jokic plunging in stride with Andre Drummond somewhere in La-la land. So, maybe that possession is unsalvageable. But, that level of resistance from Eric Gordon is shameful. 36 years old or not, you basically let Murray shove you into a locker.
Let's move on over to picking up your assignment. This is completely unacceptable:
The Sixers are so bad at picking up assignments in transition that I'm almost inclined to wonder if they'd be more organized if they lived by the "pick up who's closest to you" philosophy. It would lead to some unfavorable cross-matches. But, if finding and picking up your regular assignment is too much to ask, perhaps Philadelphia can start with one guy picking up the single opponent closest to him and build something from there.
Of course, could it be as bad as they don't know who their assignments are? At this point, I rule nothing out.
Now, that we've established that they don't have the basics down, let's look at some of the more "advanced" transition issues.
They allow second chances in primary transition:
Primary transition is the first two or three seconds of fast break offense. Secondary transition is whatever occurs beyond that initial two or three seconds. This isn't secondary transition because the Sixers don't do enough to stop the Nuggets in the first few seconds of the possession. Denver gets a shot up in primary transition, largely because George barely did anything to inhibit Christian Braun. But, once again, Eric Gordon. It's hard to blame George for not coming down with the rebound since he was the one contesting the shot. A teammate needs to be in position to either get the rebound should the shot miss or get shoved in the back by trailing foes for a loose ball foul. The Sixers (Gordon) aren't in position to have George's back, and Denver gets an uncontested second shot. The maddening part is that the Sixers let this happen regularly.
We mentioned secondary transition. Hard to expect a team to inexplicably be good at secondary transition when they're dysfunctional in primary transition:
Where do you even start with this? How about the communication on stopping the ball. There are three Sixers on Hart after he picks up his dribble. It is impossible to make that mistake if you're talking in transition. From there, simple math. Three guys on the ball, two guys left to account for four other offensive players.
And to put the cherry on top, the Sixers don't fill the cutting lanes, leaving themselves susceptible on the back side of the floor:
If you're not in the middle of the floor, you're taught to fill the lanes by sprinting wide in transition. Sprinting wide keeps the ball-handler in a more open floor because second or third defenders should be accounting for the guys filling the lanes rather than collapsing on the ball. Of course, the Sixers either don't make it down the floor or collapse on the ball very early, leaving the cutter open for a dunk if the ball-handler lobs to the back side.
Like I said, I see an everyone problem here. Daryl Morey and Elton Brand for giving Nick Nurse a group of players that either does not understand the basics of transition defense or is physically incapable of defending in transition and then expecting Nurse to be able to mold a contender out of it. Nurse for either not recognizing just how weak the group is in transition or recognizing it and not dramatically simplifying the philosophy to create some semblance of organization. I will say, I think he might be least to blame. He never had a chance with this group if they came in this fundamentally unsound and/or physically limited.
This comes down to the players, first and foremost. The clips above are all the evidence we need to levy criticism. Drummond's coasting up the floor is hurting them. Gordon's positioning and lack of resistance is hurting them. The team's lack of discipline and, frankly, effort is killing them.
Nothing - not even the return of the franchise player - can right the ship in a meaningful way until they all look in the mirror.
Want more Philadelphia 76ers news delivered straight to your inbox? Sign up for THE Philly Sports Newsletter here. 100% free, always.